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Abstract This paper aims to single out and to highlight the fundamental tenets of
Agricola’s De inuentione dialectica. After the structure of the volume, its theoretical
perspective and its educational concern are illustrated, Agricola’s understanding of
the fundamental notion of locus is expounded. In this relation his particular use of
the medieval term habitudo and the exclusion of maxims, which had been the main
concern of the Medieval doctrine of loci, show a certain distance from the Medieval
tradition. Several innovative and constructive contributions of Agricola’s work are
stressed, in particular the elaboration of a new taxonomy of loci and the discovery of
the relevant role played by loci not only in argumentation but also in exposition and
in explanation. In this way, loci acquire the status of intentiones secundae, i.e. of
meta-categorical concepts which govern the connections ensuring textual congruity.
A reading of this text in the light of contemporary argumentation theory reveals a
surprising topicality and richness of concrete contributions in some dialectical and
rhetorical domains, like argument schemes, topical potential, and presentational
techniques.
Keywords Argument schemes  Emotions  Exposition  Habitudo  Loci 
Maxims
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to bring to light the fundamental tenets of a text that has
undoubtedly represented a relevant step in the evolution of argumentation studies:
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Agricola’s De inuentione dialectica.1 My reading is based on two editions, which
both appeared in Ko¨ln in 15392 and in 15573 respectively and which both declare to
present a version of Agricola’s text according to the autograph manuscript of
Agricola recently recovered by Alardus Aemstelredamus. Quotations and references
to the original adopt the 1539 edition and the critical edition of this text without
commentaries offered by Mundt (1992).4
After the structure of the work, its theoretical perspective and its educational
purposes are outlined, Agricola’s approach to the fundamental notion of locus is
illustrated. The divergent use of the term habitudo by Agricola and by Medieval
scholars and the removal from dialectical invention of maxims, which had been the
central theoretical construct of the Medieval doctrine of loci, will allow us to
1 Born near to Groningen at Baflo (natione Friso) (February 17, 1444, see the discussion over the date of
birth in Akkerman 2012: 10 and ff.), Agricola was a ‘‘Dutch’’ scholar, humanist, and musician. He is
known to us mainly as the author of the book we are now considering. The original Dutch name Roelof
Huismann was translated by himself into Rodolphus Agricola. Educated first in St. Maartens school in
Groningen, he then matriculated at the university of Erfurt and then at the university of Louvain, where he
graduated as magister artium (distinguishing himself for the purity of his Latin and his skill in
disputation). He concentrated his studies particularly on Cicero and Quintilian. He was endowed with an
extraordinary multilingualism (see in this regard the Commentarii about the life of Agricola, written by
Johann von Plieningen for his brother, in Akkerman 2012, p. 74), both in ancient and in modern
languages: to his ever-growing language repertoire he added French and Greek during his university years
and Hebrew in his late years. He could also speak fluently and elegantly the Italian and the German
vernaculars.
After living for a time in Paris, where he worked with Heynlin von Stein,—a classics specialist—he
went, in around 1464, in Italy, where he associated with humanist masters and statesmen. In the years
1468–1475 he studied at the University of Pavia and later went to Ferrara, where he attended lectures on
the Greek language of the famous Theodorus Gaza (c. 1400–1475), also called by the epithet
Thessalonicensis, a Greek humanist and translator of Aristotle, one of the Greek scholars who were the
leaders of the revival of Greek culture in the 15th century. Here Agricola wholly devoted himself to the
study of classical texts. He won renown for the elegance of his Latin style and his knowledge of
philosophy. Also while in Ferrara he was formally employed as the organist to the ducal chapel, which
was one of the most opulent musical establishments in Europe. He held that post until 1477, after which,
having visited Rome, he definitively turned to his native country in 1481. Once in ‘‘Germany’’ again, he
spent time in Dilligen. It was in Dilligen in 1479 that Agricola finished De inuentione dialectica. In 1482,
on the invitation of Johann von Dalberg, bishop of Worms, with whom he had become friendly while in
Italy at the university of Pavia, he accepted a professorship at the University of Heidelberg and for 3 years
lectured there and at Worms on the Greek literature. In 1485 Agricola accompanied Dalberg, who was
sent as an ambassador to Innocent III the new elected Pope in Rome, but was struck gravely ill on the
journey back to home. He died in the autumn of the same year ‘‘mente in Deum porrectissima’’. In the
cultural history of Europe of the late fifteenth century, he is considered as the father of northern European
humanism (Vasoli, 1968). For more details on his life and on his works see Akkerman (2012) and Mack
(1993, 117–129).
2 Rodolphi Agricolae Phrisii de inuentione dialectica libri omnes et integri et recogniti, qui iam olim
quidem in publicum prodierunt, sed trunci ac mutili nec minus item deprauati, nunc demum ad
autographi exemplaris fidem per Alardum Aemstelredamum accuratius emendati, et additis annotatio-
nibus illustrati (…) Coloniae Ioannes Gymnicus excudebat Anno a Christo nato M. D. XXXIX.
3 Rodolphi Agricolae Phrisii de inuentione dialectica libri omnes integri et recogniti iuxta autographi,
nuper D. Alardi Aemstelredami opera in lucem educti fidem, atque doctissimis scholiis illustrati, Ioannis
Phrissem, Alardi Aemstelredami, Reinardi Hadamarii. Quorum scholia exactissimo iudicio contulit ac
congessit Ioannes Nouiomagus. Coloniae Anno M. D. LVII.
4 The references to Agricola’s text are structured as follows: the roman numeral indicates the book; the
two following numbers, divided by the colon, indicate the chapter and the line in Mundt’s edition
respectively; after the slash, the correspondent page in Ko¨ln edition of 1539 is also provided.
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consider and evaluate the polemical position of Agricola towards the Medieval
tradition. Several innovative aspects of Agricola’s contribution are expounded: the
elaboration of a new taxonomy of loci, a different, often more precise and useful,
characterization of loci, in particular of the locus from definition, and the discovery
of the relevant role played by loci not only in argumentation but also in exposition.
Eventually we show that in the light of contemporary argumentation theory this text
is found to be surprisingly topical and rich in concrete contributions, especially in
some dialectical and rhetorical domains, like argument schemes, topical potential,
and presentational techniques.
2 Three Books Focusing on Loci
In the three books on dialectical invention (Agricola 1539), the attitude of
Rodolphus Agricola towards tradition is inspired both by continuity and innovation.
In line with the late-ancient and medieval tradition, his main focus is centered on
loci: the whole first (longest) book of the treatise is devoted to the investigation of
the nature of loci, which are defined in general and described in detail, often by
adopting punctual semantic analyses. The second book specifies the uses of loci and,
eventually, the third mainly focuses on the rhetorical effectiveness of arguments and
loci are again considered in this perspective.
In the Prooemium (I, 1: 11/p. 1) the three tasks ascribed by ancient rhetoric to
human discourse (oratio) are mentioned: informing and teaching (ut doceat5),
moving (ut moveat), pleasing or entertaining (ut delectet). Discourse can inform
without moving or entertaining, but it can neither move nor entertain without
informing. Therefore information proves to be its essential, ever present, function.
Depending on the speaker’s intention, this informative function may alternatively
assume two forms: sometimes we let the hearer know something simply to make him
understand it, thus fulfilling a function of exposition, sometimes we let somebody
know something in order to establish a belief in what is said, thus performing an
argumentation (I, 1: 30–31/p. 2). The author defines exposition as a discourse that
only manifests the mind (mentem ‘‘communicative intention’’) of the speaker,
without activating anything that aims at arousing trust in the hearer. Argumentation
is instead defined as a discourse through which somebody tries to build trust in the
thing he is speaking about. Now, as what is uncertain cannot as such support itself,
we must infer trustworthiness moving from other, better known and more familiar
things. These things are arguments or, following Cicero, reasonable devices or
inventions (probabile inventum) through which some uncertain things are given
trustworthiness (I, 1: 34–38/p. 2). Since not everyone is able to promptly identify
such devices, in Agricola’s opinion, the identification of loci, understood as some
seats or places whence arguments can be drawn, represents a particularly useful
educational endeavor: as possible beneficiaries, he especially mentions people
engaged in political, legal, educational, moral and religious discourse and stresses
5 The Latin word doceo means in general contexts ‘‘to let know’’ or ‘‘to inform’’, and in the educational
contexts ‘‘to teach’’.
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that the system of loci does not simply educate the mouth, by offering a rhetorical
enrichment (copia dicendi), but it also ensures wisdom of judgment (prouidentia) in
consulting and in pondering decisions (I, 1: 64–69/pp. 2–3).
Following Cicero (Topica, 6, in Reinhardt ed. 2003) and Boethius (De differentiis
topicis, 1173B, in Stump ed. 1978), he distinguishes, within dialectic—understood,
according to the usual definition, as the art of arguing (ars disserendi) (II, 2: 20/p.
191)—a heuristic and an evaluative component: the latter one is identified with
Aristotelian Analytics and De sophisticis elenchis (iudicii pars, cui omnis de modis
figurisque syllogismorum praeceptio et cautio omnis captiosarum argumentatio-
num, quas fallacias dixere, subseruit) (I, 2: 86–88/p. 9) and is not the proper subject
of Agricola’s opus which is wholly devoted to the former component (Sed nos de
priore illa parte quae ad inueniendum pertinet loquemur) (I, 2: 89–90/p. 9). So,
separating the topical component from the normative one, and thus overthrowing
the logically oriented Medieval tradition started by Boethius, Agricola recovers
from Roman rhetoric (in particular from Cicero and Quintilian) an approach
ascribing to rhetoric a relevant role towards dialectic, where dialectic, reduced to
inuentio, appears to be mainly justified because it is useful for rhetoric. Therefore
the program of Agricola’s dialectic, though recovering a unitary perspective
comprising rhetoric and dialectic and thus, somehow, anticipating the strategic
maneuvering perspective adopted by the extended version of Pragma-Dialectics
(van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002; van Eemeren 2010) could hardly be compared
with it, because, being exclusively committed to the finding (discovering) of
arguments, its dialectical approach postpones the commitment of ensuring
argumentation validity.
Here, a clarification is, however, useful. The fact that the evaluative component is
not given a central position in the design of the work did not at all condition
Agricola’s work in its actual realization, since a strong critical commitment
frequently emerges from his pages.6 Consequently the impression prevails that
dialectic and rhetoric are, in actu exercito, correctly reconciled. Moreover, at the
beginning of the second book the specific role of the normative (logical) component
of dialectic is concisely, but clearly highlighted; ‘‘It is ignored even by very learned
people that no argumentation represents a necessary inference simply because it is
drawn from species or genus or any other locus, but that it obtains cogency only
when there is such a connection between things that can be formulated as a
syllogism or any other approved logical form, by means of which we can conclude
that the connected things are necessarily connected’’7 (II, 1: 32–40/p. 179).
6 See, on this point, the remarks made by Mack (1993: 168).
7 ‘‘Nec intelligunt doctissimi uiri (sic enim modestissimum mihi est ipsos uocare) nullam argumenta-
tionem, quia a specie, uel genere, uel quouis aliorum locorum ducatur, necessario cohaerere: quoniam ex
omnibus istis ineptae et minime cohaerentes duci queant, sed tum demum cohaerere argumentationem,
cum est ea rerum inter se conditio, ut possint coniici in syllogismi uel aliam quampiam formam
argumentandi probatam, per quam cohaerentes inter se res, et necessaario connexas esse colligatur’’.
Here and in other passages of the paper, Agricola’s Latin text is rendered through my own English
translation. The German translation of Mundt (1992) was also considered. The original Latin text,
however, is always provided.
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But let us come back to the interpretation of the system of loci (ratio locorum)
that represents the main concern of Agricola’s work. His awareness of the
ontological nature of loci8 (see I, 2: 96–106/p. 9) is absolutely evident: ‘‘All things
that are said in favor or against the standpoint are bound together and are (so to say)
connected by a sort of solidarity of nature’’.9
The endless variety of things and of their distinctive features cannot be embraced
by any discourse nor by any mind. ‘‘Inherent to all things, there is although a
common habitudo and all things tend to a similarity of nature: like the fact that all
things have their own substance, all things originate from some causes and, in turn,
cause something; and thus the most intelligent men have drawn from that enormous
variety of things these common headings (capita10) like substance, cause, result, and
the other headings, which we shall consider in the following’’11 (I, 2: 91–93/p. 9). A
locus is nothing else but a certain aspect characterizing the thing (rei nota),
orienting us in identifying what, in relation to each standpoint, can provide
acceptability12 (ibid.).
But how should the term habitudo be interpreted? This term had played a central
role in the Medieval doctrine of loci, where it was understood as the ontological
relationship (like cause to effect, definition to defined, means to end etc.) binding
the state of affairs exploited as argument to the state of affairs constituting the
standpoint (Rigotti 2008). In other words, every locus was understood as a particular
type of habitudo in the sense of ‘‘se habere ad’’13 (‘‘to be related to’’). It is rather
8 Agricola’s realistic position and its connection with the Medieval scholastic doctrines of universals are
investigated by Nauta (2012).
9 ‘‘omnia quae uel pro re quaque uel contra dicuntur, cohaerere, et esse cum ea quadam (ut ita dicam)
naturae societate coniuncta.’’
10 The term is used by Cicero (Topica 39) with a different meaning in relation to the argument from
genus, which should not necessarily be identified with the ultimate genus (non erit necesse usque a capite
arcessere), but simply with the immediately relevant genus.
11 ‘‘Inest tamen omnibus (tametsi suis quaeque discreta sint notis) communis quaedam habitudo, et
cuncta ad naturae tendunt similitudinem, ut quod est omnibus substantia quaedam sua, omnia ex aliquibus
oriuntur causis; omnia aliquid efficiunt. Ingeniosissimi itaque uirorum, ex effusa illa rerum varietate,
communia ista capita: uelut substantiam, causam, euentum, quaeque reliqua mox dicemus, excerpsere,
uelut cum ad considerandam rem quampiam animum aduertissemus, sequentes ista: statim per omnem rei
naturam et partes, perque omnia consentanea et dissidentia iremus, et duceremus inde argumentum
propositis rebus accomodatum.’’
12 ‘‘Non ergo aliud est locus, quam communis quaedam rei nota, cuius admonitu, quid in quaque re
probabile fit, potest inueniri’’.
13 The following passages of Peter of Spain (see Bochenski ed. 1947), Abelard (see De Rijk ed. 1970)
and Buridan (2001) do clearly highlight the notion of habitudo:
‘‘Locus a causa efficiente est habitudo ipsius ad suum effectum’’ (‘‘The locus from efficient cause is the
relation of the thing to its effect’’) (Petri Hispani Summulae logicales, 5.24);
‘‘Est autem locus-differentia ea res in cuius habitudine ad aliam firmitas consecutionis consi-
stit.’’(‘‘Locus-differentia is the thing in whose relation to another thing the solidity of the inference is
created’’) (Abaelardi De dialectica, 263);.
‘‘Locus-differentia maximae est termini ex quibus constituitur maxima et ex quorum habitudine ad
invicem maxima habet notitiam et veritatem. Verbi gratia, cum haec propositio ‘Quidquid vere affirmatur
de genere vere affirmatur de specie’ sit locus maxima, isti termini ‘species’ et ‘genus’ sunt locus-
differentia maximae: ex habitudine enim speciei ad suum genus maxima habet veritatem et efficaciam’’
(Buridani Summulae de dialectica 6.2.2). (‘‘Locus-differentia maximae are the terms of which the maxim
consists and from whose mutual relation the maxim draws recognition and truthfulness. For instance, if
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clear that in Agricola’s text this term does not refer to the relational nature of loci,
but to the analogous functional configuration which is shared, due to a solidarity of
nature, by all things.14 Such habitudo is identified with the net of ontological roles
played in different connections by all entities: all things have their own substance,
all things originate from some causes and, in turn, cause something, all events take
place in a certain time and so on. Curiously, though clearly misunderstanding the
medieval notion of habitudo and reading it as the nominalization of se habere’’ (to
be in a certain way) and not of ‘‘se habere ad’’ (to be in a certain relation to),
Agricola’s conception of loci is substantially compatible with the notion of loci
elaborated by the medieval scholars. In fact, in the descriptions offered by Agricola,
the headings the loci are identified with are relational in nature: the definition versus
the defined, the time and the place versus the event, the efficient cause versus the
effect and so on. Nonetheless, Agricola focuses on another relational dimension of
loci: they are headings (capita), to be understood as the semantic nodes building a
sort of conceptual network which maps reality.
3 The Removal of Maxims
There are aspects for which Agricola distances himself more decidedly from the
Medieval tradition. In general, a rather polemical attitude towards all medieval
scholars is evident. They are cumulatively referred to as ‘‘qui post Boethium
scripserunt’’ (see, in particular, I, 3: 152/p. 18 and I, 29: 29–30/p. 175). The
renowned philosopher and theologian John Duns Scotus15 is mentioned with the
formula ‘‘secta Scoti’’ (Agricola 1539, p. 41).16 The medieval terminology is largely
abandoned or even misunderstood (see above for habitudo). For important respects,
his criticisms also involve Boethius from whom the Medieval tradition originates.
The classification (diuisio) of loci is partially modified and, more importantly, the
mediating role of maxims (maximae propositiones) is ignored. Now, as maxims are
the inferential connections generated by the loci17 on which the actual arguments
Footnote 13 continued
the proposition ‘anything that is truthfully affirmed of the genus is truthfully affirmed of the species too’
is the maxim, the terms ‘species’ and ‘genus’ are the locus-differentia maximae: as a matter of fact, this
maxim has validity and effectiveness on the basis of the relation between the species and its genus’’).
Interestingly, while the first passage only underlines the relational nature of locus, the second also
focuses on the inferential strength ensured by locus to maxim and the third, moreover, ascribes to locus
the communicative potential of maxim.
14 The German translation by Mundt suggests ‘‘a¨ußere Gestalt’’ as translation of the term habitudo.
15 John Duns Scotus (1265/66-1308) was one of the most influential philosophers and theologians of the
of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. His brilliant thought earned him the nickname ‘‘the Subtle
Doctor’’. Topics like the semantics of religious language, the problem of universals, the nature of human
freedom were innovatively investigated by him. For a general overview of his work and his life see Gilson
(1952).
16 The pages from 37 to 41 of the 1539 edition of De inuentione dialectica, containing Agricola’s
reflections about ‘‘Singulares aliquot de uniuersalibus quaestiones’’, are omitted in Mundt’s edition.
17 The role played by maxims in the inferential organization of arguments is expounded more in detail in
Rigotti and Greco Morasso (2010).
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build, loci are directly bound to actual arguments. In the end of the first book (I, 29:
29–34/p. 175–176) our author tries to justify the absence of maxims in his system of
topics. He reminds that ‘‘Boethius and those who wrote after him (quique post eum
scripserunt) added to each locus, to adopt a usual expression, a certain Maxim, i.e. a
statement, comprising in a proposition many aspects, to which undoubted trust is
paid, like Of whatever the definition is said, the defined is also said or Of whatever
the species is said, the genus is said too’’.18 Now, the author decided to ignore
maxims not because, in his opinion, neither Aristotle nor Cicero had considered
them,19 but because he thought they were simply useless for several reasons.
Firstly, Agricola argues, maxims can be construed only in relation to those loci
which provide necessary arguments, but they do not fit (parum conveniet) for loci
providing probable arguments, which are the majority (I, 29: 36–39/p. 176).
Secondly, there are many such loci in which these maxims cannot be comprised
in any defined and sufficiently convenient form (in nullam certam et satis
conuenientem formam concludi hae maximae possint) (I, 29: 39–40/p. 176). In
Agricola’s opinion, sometimes Boethius appears to be at pain while trying to assign
to any locus its own maxim (dum cuilibet loco maximam suam reddere cupit) so
that, while the locus is, as a rule, very widely extended, the maxim often receives a
very narrow scope (I, 29: 40–43/p. 176). Several examples are given, approximately
rendering Boethius’ text (cf. De differentiis topicis 1189C, in Stump ed. 1978) in
relation to the loci from efficient cause (Quorum efficientia naturalia sunt, eorum
effecta sunt naturalia—If the causes are natural, the effects are natural), and in
relation to the locus from the matter (ibid. 1189D) (Cuius materia deest, et id quod
ex ea efficitur deest—If the matter lacks, the thing made of this matter lacks too) and
others (I, 29: 43–48/p. 176). In my opinion, this criticism depends rather evidently
on an imprecise interpretation of Boethius’ text: Agricola interprets maxims as rules
bijectively corresponding to loci: cuilibet loco maximam suam reddere cupit. Even
though Boethius’ text might suggest this interpretation because, in general, it pairs
up one maxim with one locus differentia, it also manifests his awareness that
maxims outnumber loci differentiae: ‘‘Atque ideo pauciores esse deprehenduntur hi
loci qui in differentiis positi sunt quam propositiones ipsae quarum sunt
differentiae’’ (1186B) and in several cases more than one maxim is given in
relation to one locus differentia (see 1188D–1189A, where, for the locus a partibus,
two maxims are provided). Therefore, between loci differentiae and maxims,
Boethius, and even more explicitly the Medieval scholars,20 establish an injective
relation: one or more maxims, yet, in general, several maxims correspond to one
locus, while only one locus corresponds to each maxim. In other words, each maxim
18 ‘‘Boe¨tium, quique post eum scripserunt de locis, singulis locis addidisse quandam (ut uulgo loquimur)
maximam, id est, pronunciatum quoddam, una sententia multa complexum, cui indubitata sit fides: Ut, de
quocunque definitio dicitur, de eo definitum. De quocunque species, de eo genus.’’
19 While this is the case for Cicero, it is not indeed the case for Aristotle who, though not specifying
explicitly the notion of maxim, covers with the term ‘‘topoi’’ both numerous maxim-like rules (Braet
2005; Rigotti 2008).
20 In Abelard’s Dialectica (264, in De Rijk ed. 1970) loci (maximarum propositionum differentiae) are
said to be fewer (pauciores) than maxims, because ‘‘eiusdem differentiae multae maximae propositiones
esse possunt’’ (the same locus differentia can have many maxims).
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focuses on one of the inferential implications of the locus and therefore does not
exhaust the argumentative potential of the locus. This is the reason why, while the
locus is more widely extended, the maxim shows to have a much narrower scope.
The third decisive reason for considering maxims as useless, is that, in Agricola’s
opinion, all in all, people who have been thoroughly taught the nature of loci do not
need maxims, as they spontaneously show themselves to their mind; and, if it is not
the case, these people do not deserve to be taught the loci21 (I, 29: 53–61/p. 176). In
other words, studying maxims is useless because they spontaneously spring from a
good awareness of loci.
I feel committed to concisely evaluate the arguments brought by Agricola. The
three justifications for the removal of maxims from dialectical invention indeed lack
the due cogency: the first one is not at all highlighted nor, all the less, argued for; the
second and the third justifications are at least partially incompatible as the second
emphasizes the difficulty to assign to the locus its own maxim and the third pretends
that maxims spontaneously spring from a good awareness of loci. Moreover, the
second is based on a premise (the bijective nature of the relation binding maxims to
loci) contradicting not only the interpretation of maxims by Boethius and the
Medieval scholars, but also the significant evidences brought by them. Eventually,
while the first and the second reasons criticize maxims as theoretical constructs, the
third one, which is possibly the most important in the general design of the work,
questions the educational and not the theoretical relevance of their study.
In fact, the removal of maxims from the system of loci might be explained by the
prevailingly non-theoretical, but practical and educational purpose of this work,
which is consistent with the focus on inuentio, already declared in the title, but it is
maybe also bound to the author’s lack of interest in and commitment to the study of
the inferential configuration of arguments. Besides, the inferential configuration of
arguments could force him to reconsider the contributions of the Medieval scholars,
who, in his eyes, were guilty of an excessive and useless formalism22 and, above all,
of largely ignoring the relevance of rhetoric.
However, the unquestionable presence of a practical, educational concern in the
design of the work should not prevent us from seizing those innovative, critical and
theoretical, contributions that are offered in all three books.
21 ‘‘Adde, quod si quis exacte et penitus cognitam habuerit locorum naturam, nihil erunt ei opus hae
maximae, quoniam ultro fere in animum incurrunt, et apertiores sunt quam ut sint discendae. At si quis
tam prorsus expers ingenii sit tamque a` communi sensu rerum abhorrens, ut apertissima illa propemodum
per se nota docendus sit, illi ego nihilo magis, quae de locis praecipiuntur, profutura crediderim, qua`m
Cimmeriis (quos perpetua nebularum caligine opertos tradunt poe¨tae) ea, quae de positione siderum
deque ipsorum figuris motuque traduntur.’’
22 In the third book, the excessive use of formal notions and procedures is also identified with the cause
of the removal of moral philosophy from education (III, 14: 35–39/pp. 440–441). Syllogistic doctrine is
not rejected but limited to the very initial phase of educational path within the school environment (III,
14: 50–53/p. 441).
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4 Innovative Aspects
In order to better characterize Agricola’s contribution, I focus now on some
innovative aspects of his doctrine, namely his critical attitude towards tradition, his
treatment of loci, and the distinction between argumentation and exposition.
4.1 Critical Attitude Towards Tradition
His autonomous, correctly critical, attitude towards the authorities of tradition (even
those authorities whom he in general acknowledges and confirms) is often stressed
and, even though the contributions by Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Themistius and
Boethius are mentioned and brought out, a number of criticisms are addressed to
each of them.
In particular, regarding Aristotle, Agricola’s judgment is inspired by esteem and
admiration, but he avoids any ‘‘ipse dixit’’ devotion: ‘‘Ego Aristotelem summo
ingenio, doctrina… summum quidem hominem, sed hominem tamen fuisse puto’’ (I,
3: 50–53/p. 15) (I believe that Aristotle was a man of the highest intelligence,
culture … a man of the highest level, but that he was a man). In other words,
Aristotle was one whom something could escape, so that this could be discovered by
somebody else (aliis post se invenienda reliquerit) (I, 3: 53–55/p. 15). A point
where Agricola distances himself from Aristotle is the debate on the scope of
dialectic: while Aristotle restricts dialectic to issues which have not to be
determined by the particular sciences and on which there is something to be said on
both sides, thus finding dialectic useful mainly for the purpose of arguing, Agricola
insists that part of the role of dialectic is to teach the separate sciences how to find
their materials. Agricola ascribes to dialectic the function of method for the other
subjects (Mack 1993: 176). Many other more specific criticisms are directed at
Aristotle, in particular in relation to the eight books of Topics. First, the scope of the
considered matter is too narrow, as only the loci bound to the four predicables are
tackled. Moreover, he does not describe the loci nor does he establish their number
and their names and, very often, some matters are counted as loci that are not at all
related to argumentation (like various prescriptions and suggestions to the arguer
aiming at improving his performance at communicative and interactional level).
Eventually, no indications are provided for the use of loci in the construction of
arguments, so that the Aristotelian claim of providing an instrument which enables
us to find proper arguments in favor and against every standpoint becomes vain (I,
3: 66–133/p. 15–17).
Now, the very hard task of implementing Aristotle’s program of Topics was not
fulfilled by his followers of the Peripatetic school, but by people like Cicero, who
construed a list of certain and definite loci that could be universally applied. At the
beginning, Cicero limited himself to listing them (in De oratore and Partitiones),
then in Topica, the book entirely devoted to the loci, copiosius omnia exsecutus est
(the whole matter was tackled more in detail). Unfortunately, also in homage to the
jurist Trebatius, to whom the book is devoted, Cicero draws almost all examples
from civil law (I, 3: 134–142/p. 17).
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Quintilian (see Winterbottom ed. 1970), whom he follows on many questions, is
criticized for the indeed scarce space and care devoted to loci in the fifth book of
Institutio oratoria, (I, 3: 143–147/p. 18), but he is also sharply blamed in relation to
an aspect which might appear as a modest detail, but, at a closer look, shows to
constitute a fundamental theoretical tenet: ‘‘Ea [tekmeria] Quintilianus inter
argumenta non putat habenda, quia nihil post se dubii relinquant’’ (I, 21: 190–197/
pp. 112–113) (Quintilian thinks that these [undoubted clues] should not be
numbered as arguments because they do not leave behind any doubt). Now,
Agricola wonders how such an idea, excluding from argumentation all mathemat-
ical reasoning, which is manifestly aimed at unquestionable conclusions, could enter
the mind of such an intelligent man. Our author recalls that any argumentative
activity aims ‘‘ut quam minimum dubitandi relinquamus locum’’ (to leave open to
doubt the smallest possible space).23
Themistius and Boethius are also mentioned, the former for having proposed a
second list of loci, and the latter for first having simply (Boethius non aliud sane
uidetur egisse) reported Cicero’s and Themistius’ lists and then having compared
them (I, 3: 149–150/p. 18). This judgment is manifestly inadequate and unjust. In
my opinion, it is motivated by the relevance ascribed by Boethius to the maxim (in
his terminology locus maxima) and its differentiation from the locus differentia
maximae (Stump 1978), which is properly the locus. About ‘‘people who wrote after
Boethius’’ two remarks are made by Agricola, one of which is very questionable and
not particularly relevant (they would have followed Themistius and not Boethius),
while the other is profound and almost shocking: ‘‘They limited themselves to
mentioning loci or to characterizing them with few words, because they considered
that a deeper knowledge of loci is to be drawn from a more profound philosophical
study’’24 (I, 3: 152–155/p. 18).
Particularly interesting is the conclusion of Agricola’s critical overview of the
state of the art: eventually, as one who was not ready to swear by the words of
anybody, he had decided to each time follow the most convincing author or, in lack
of a convincing author, to simply follow reason. However, he does not claim to
realize anything better, he is more modestly committed to explaining the matter,
maybe with less subtlety but more clarity.
4.2 The Treatment of Loci
4.2.1 The Taxonomy of Loci
The reflections by means of which our author elaborates the classification of loci
and specifies the nature of each locus are often innovative and sharp. Moreover,
23 On this regard, Mack (1993: 177 and ff.) remarks that, differently from Cicero, Agricola can not be
defined as an Academic skeptic, since for Agricola the ‘‘certain’’ is included in the probabile. In support
of this view, Mack cites a number of passages in the De inuentione dialectica ‘‘which show him
[Agricola] treating certain arguments as part of the probabile and in which he speaks of things being true
or certain’’.
24 ‘‘Omnes tamen satis crediderunt, locos vel nominare vel paucissimis signare, quid essent, verbis.
Credo, quo`d arbitrati sint, altiorem locorum notitiam ex penitiore philosophia petendam.’’
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especially in the second book, numerous fine examples are given. The criteria that
are used are concisely reported in the scheme construed by the editors on the basis
of chapter 4 of the first book (see Fig. 1).
In its whole, Agricola’s taxonomy presents a coherent tree structure: at the
highest level, internal and external loci are distinguished, the former being situated
either in the constituency (substantia) of the concerned thing or around it, the latter
presenting a gradually decreasing closeness to the thing.
In the thing (within or around its constituency) we find the definition and the
predicables (genus, species, property), the whole and its parts and the coniugates,
like wise versus wisdom, where wisdom is constitutive of the wise man not in order
to be a man, but to be a wise man. Around the constituency are, in relation to a
subject, those states of affairs, both static (adiacentia) and dynamic (actus), in
which the subject is involved, and the subject itself.
Regarding the external loci, a strong differentiation emerges: the cognata
embrace both causes (efficient and final) and outcomes (effects and destinata); the
applicita comprise place, time and the connexa, which are the correlative states, i.e.
Fig. 1 Agricola’s typology of loci. This schema of Agricola’s typology is elaborated from a schema
offered by the editors of the 1557 edition (p. 39). The original has been accurately followed, merely
simplifying and rationalizing the graphics
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the states of the thing entailing the presence of another thing (like being a married or
rich man, which entails the presence of a wife and of a certain wealth respectively);
the accidents gather rather different non-constitutive aspects and circumstances;
eventually the incompatibles (repugnantia) comprise opposites and divergents.
If we compare Agricola’s taxonomy of loci with the taxonomy proposed by
Boethius (see Stump ed. 1978), which was later largely confirmed and deepened by
many Medieval scholars, numerous similarities but also relevant differences
emerge, mainly in relation to the frontier dividing internal and external loci. Indeed,
even though the most general distinction between internal and external loci is
confirmed, and the maximum of closeness to the thing, i.e. to the standpoint, is
identified with the loci from definition and from the whole and its parts, numerous
loci, like the causes and the applicita, which were traditionally numbered among the
internal ones, are moved to the other class. The criterion for the belonging to the
internal loci had been identified by Buridan (Summulae de dialectica. 6.2.3, see
Buridan 2001) with the fact that either the two terms constituting the habitudo of the
locus denote the same reality (supponunt pro eodem) or the reality denoted by one is
included in the reality denoted by the other for some mode of ‘‘being in’’ (in my
opinion, in the sense that they belong to the same possible world). Thus, the
comparison of Agricola’s taxonomy to the traditional model shows that a strong and
relevant justification of the fundamental dichotomy got lost. The classification of the
applicita among the external loci might also be questioned, first because time and
place are strictly constitutive of situations (adiacentia) and events (actus), which are
consistently numbered among the internal loci, and secondly because the
correlatives (connexa), like king versus kingdom or husband versus wife (where
the first term imposes a coexistence condition on the second) prove to equally
pertain to the internal loci.
However, despite some inconsistencies and a certain theoretical impoverishment,
apparently due to the negligence of the relevant contributions provided by Medieval
scholars, Agricola’s taxonomy constitutes a real advancement, regarding the
identification and justification of the single loci and the innovative categories
adopted in the construction of the major classes.
4.2.2 Definitions Towards Ontologies
Let us now consider some of the fine analyses elaborated by Agricola for loci. His
treatment of definition (I, 5) is rigorous and innovative; definition is first
distinguished from description, because its purpose is to say what the thing is and
not how it is. Agricola confirms the validity of the classical Aristotelian procedure
for defining, which connects the next genus (genus proximum) with the specific
difference. However, he also remarks that perfectly fitting definitions, like Homo est
animal rationale, where rationale really identifies the constitutive trait character-
izing humans among all other animals, are not available for non-humans. For all
other non-human species, which are called bruta in Latin, like donkeys, mules and
horses, no specific difference in form of one predicate is available. Here, a
conjunction of predicates like auritus (long-eared), solidis pedibus (single toed) and
foecundus (fertile) plays the role of specific difference, as it enables us to
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differentiate the nature of donkeys from all other animals: single toed are only
donkeys, horses and mules, but horses are not long-eared and mules are not fertile.
Consequently: ‘‘itaque tandem velut gradibus quibusdam ad id quod definitum est
peruenitur’’ (I, 5: 41–43/p. 27) (eventually, we arrive, by climbing a kind of steps, at
the defined). Not simply connecting genus with specific difference, but conjoining
often complex sets of predicates (see complexus definitionis, I, 5: 74–75/p. 27) is
necessary in order to define many entities and states of affairs. This way, definition
procedures get very close to the ontologies25 elaborated in current trends of semantics.
Agricola also stresses the rhetorical usefulness to the arguer of designing such
definitions/ontologies, not only in order to know the things, ‘‘which, having been
made explicit by means of the definition, suggest to the mind—it is strange how it
happens—some precise orientations regarding the thoughts that should be unfolded,
but also to enhance the arguer’s authority’’26 (I, 5: 109–103/p. 28–29). The author
proposes two fair examples, by defining as many social realities: ius (law) and
ciuitas (political community). In both cases the definition is the result of intense
considerations through which the distinctive function of each predicate of the
definition is justified.
More in detail, a conceptual basis constituting the genus is enriched (specified)
step by step, by adding all traits that prove to be needed in order to differentiate the
concerned domain from all other domains. I simply report the conclusion of the
second definition procedure: ‘‘Dicemus itaque ciuitatem esse multitudinem collec-
tam, ad statum rerum suarum tuendum per se sufficientem, quae consensu sit legum
uitaeque conniuncta’’ (I, 5: 96–98/p. 28) (Therefore we shall say that a ciuitas is a
multitude of people gathered together, in itself sufficient to the defense of its goods,
and that is kept together by the communal acceptance of laws and ways of life).
4.2.3 Analysis of the Domain of Events and Actions
In general, Agricola’s taxonomy seems to upset the system of Aristotelian
categories. The loci circa substantiam (around the substance) embrace the
categories of quality and quantity under the unique label of adiacentia (covering
the static states of affairs) (I, 11), while the categories of action and passion are
subsumed under the wider category of events or dynamic states of affairs (‘‘Quod
igitur proprie actus est, id oportet ut sit in quadam agitatione … positum’’, I, 12:
25 The term ontology refers, especially in Aristotelian philosophical tradition, to the doctrine of being.
Thus the traditional philosophical concept of ontology is mainly meant to deal with questions concerning
what entities exist or at what conditions they can be said to exist, by what relations they are bound
together and how they can be grouped and related within a hierarchy, and subdivided according to
similarities and differences. More recently, within computer science and information science, the term
ontology has been used for referring to a formal representation of a set of concepts within a domain and
the relationships between those concepts, that may be used to define the domain and to reason about its
(constitutive) properties. In my opinion, while, in general, loci are situated by Agricola in the domain
defined by the first notion of ontology, Agricola’s understanding of definition is close to this second
notion of ontology.
26 ‘‘Utilis est haec definiendi ratio, cum propter rerum cognitionem, quae definitione explicatae, mirum
est quo pacto uelut certum quoddam signum destinandarum cogitationum proponant animo: tum quod
parat autoritatem disserenti.’’
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62–63/p. 72), which are named actus (I, 12) and the locus of subject comes to
coincide with the substance in which both static and dynamic states of affairs are
inherent (I, 13). Within the locus of events (actus), action (actio) is specified as a
purposeful behavior, (I, 4: 45/p. 23 and I, c.12: 42–44/p. 71: ‘‘finem aliquem
respicit’’). Interestingly, the author makes a distinction between the purpose and the
effect of an action and gives a fine example to highlight it (I, 4: 55–58/p. 23): shoes
are the effect of shoemaker’s action, while protection of feet is its purpose.
4.3 Argumentation Versus Exposition
In the 16th chapter of the second book, Agricola brings to light that loci, as headings
of the semantic network shaping the map of reality, do not exhaust their role in the
construction of arguments (see also Mack 1993), as they are not less relevant in
expositio, i.e. in the presentation of reality. The role played in exposition is
particularly important for two main reasons: it stresses the ontological nature of loci,
as it is properly understood by Agricola, and specifies the differences, without
neglecting the connections, between explanation and argumentation.
Loci are not exclusively argumentative categories. They are the nodes of the
ontological structure of reality and are used in its representation for describing it,
explaining it and arguing for it and from it.
Moreover, considering, in particular, causal exposition or explanation, Agricola
discovers that the same state of affairs can be referred to both in explanatory and in
argumentative terms. A renowned passage of Virgil’s Aeneid (II, 16: 27/p.
258–259) is mentioned (Urbs antiqua fuit, Tyrii tenuere coloni, Karthago… Aeneid
I Book, vv. 12–80, see Colombo ed. 1967), in which the poet recollects the causes
why Juno hated Aeneas. In a different communicative situation, in which Juno’s
hate against Aeneas might be doubted (thus becoming a standpoint), the discourse
would be transformed into an argumentation and the causal relations used by Virgil
in order to explain Juno’s hostile feeling would be used as arguments to prove the
truth of this feeling. Another interesting example refers to the eclipse of the moon
(II, 16: 43–53/p. 259). Let us consider the interposition of the earth between the sun
and the moon. One can explain the eclipse of the moon as the effect of such an
interposition, but the evidence of this particular position of the earth could, in
another communicative interaction, also be interpreted as an argument allowing to
predict an eclipse of the moon.
4.4 Emotions, Arrangement and Other Presentational Techniques
The third book concisely elaborates on numerous presentational techniques aimed at
the effectiveness of argumentation and investigates how audience can be influenced
by exciting and orienting its feelings and can be entertained and even delighted by
inducing in it a benevolent and careful attitude and, eventually, what arrangement
(dispositio) of issues, partes orationis and arguments should be preferred in
different argumentative situations and in different types of discourse.
Emotion (Latin affectus, ‘‘modification of mind’’) is defined as an impetus or
impulse by which we are driven with more vehemence, compared with a quiet mood
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of mind, to pursue and to escape expedient and harmful things respectively. More in
detail, inasmuch as they inhere to possible events, good and evil cause attraction or
repulsion respectively; instead, inasmuch as they characterize real facts, they
engender a joyful reaction or sorrow depending on whether such facts involve
people who deserve or people who do not deserve to be involved in them—where,
by definition, the arguer merits to be affected only by nice things—(III, 1–4).
Loci are once again invoked to specify the nature of emotions, in particular to
distinguish the role of subject (see above Sect. 4.2.1) as the person affected by the
event and of efficient cause as the person bringing about the event. In connection
with this distinction two fundamental emotions are explained: mercy arises toward
the person who is victim of an unjust, undue harm, while hate is excited against the
person who has caused it. The generation of emotions in the discourse (oratio) can
take a threefold form: they can be simulated or indeed experienced by the speaker;
they can be represented as experienced by the people the discourse refers to; or they
can be excited in the audience by the discourse (III, 2). All in all, Agricola’s
treatment of feelings is very concise: the readers are invited to recur for a more
comprehensive treatment to Aristotle’s Rhetoric and to mainly exploit their sensus
communis in connecting the nature of the event with the audience’s attitudes (III, 1:
67–71/p. 380). As in the generation of emotions appearance is somehow more
important than reality, presentational techniques show to play an emergent role. For
instance, the emotional effect produced by evoking the scenery of war is far stronger
if war is not simply mentioned by the noun, but it is vividly rendered by listing a
number of its harmful effects (metus hostiles, praedae incendiaque uillarum,
expugnationes oppidorum, expensas militares …) (III, 3: 52–60/p. 388).
Strategies triggering emotional effectiveness, as well as other procedures aimed
at defining the size of the discourse by unfolding or narrowing its design, which
properly pertain to elocutionary rhetoric, are given only a very concise treatment
and the reader is referred to the larger presentations offered by Aristotle, Cicero and
Quintilian. More attention is paid (III, 8–16) to the strategies of arrangement
(dispositio), which in Antiquity had received only a cursory consideration.
Indeed, this subject is shortly hinted in the eighth Book of Aristotle’s Topics. Not
much more space is devoted to it by Quintilian, who in the seventh Book of his
treatise (see Winterbottom ed. 1970), after having denied the existence of any
general rule regarding the art of disposition (nullis perpetuis legibus statui credidit
posse: III, 8: 18–19/p. 413), suggests that decisions on these matters can be taken
only in strict connection with the concrete situation. Agricola is instead convinced
that, not differently from invention, some systematic approach should be identified
for disposition too.
Agricola’s elaboration of the subject moves from the distinction of the different
principles disposition is concerned with, namely the natural, the arbitrary and the
artificial orders. The natural order is the order inhering to the matter itself (the
referent of the discourse); the arbitrary order coincides with the absence of any
natural order or with the negligence of the existing natural order by the speaker,
who, in both cases, adopts in the discourse the disposition that is suggested by the
opportunities of concatenation that are offered by the ongoing discourse, (utcumque
alia [sc. res] alii aptissime ex dicendi occasione subtexi potest, proinde
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subiungitur); the artificial order occurs when, the natural order is twisted on purpose
and the order adopted in the discourse only depends on principles governing the
construction of the discourse itself (III, 8: 38–55/pp. 413–414).
Particularly in relation to argumentative discourses, the natural order proves to be
relevant. Four dimensions of the referent are distinguished and as many subtypes of
order are singled out: (1) the temporal sequence of events; (2) the semantic-logical
implications between the constituents of the same state of affairs, in the sense that,
ontologically, the presupposed precedes the presupposing (the substance precedes in
this dimension the accident because it is presupposed by the accident) and, from
another perspective, what is known precedes the unknown; (3) the order deriving
from the perspective adopted in relation to different reference points; (4) the order
following the adopted hierarchies of dignity and value27 (III, 8: 56–86/p. 414).
The genre to which the discourse belongs influences the choice of the type and
the subtype of order (III, 9: 3–5/p. 416 and ff.). For instance, if they are historical,
the discourses in which exposition of events dominates privilege the natural-
temporal order, while, if they are poetic, they usually recur to different strategies of
artificial order. In the first case an effect of trustworthiness (of adherence to reality)
is created, while other, different, values are pursued by the poet through artificial
orders.
In the fifteenth chapter of the third book, Agricola collects several pieces of
advice that should be carefully observed throughout the argumentative interaction
(cautiones aliquot inter argumentandum diligenter observandae). These pieces of
advice are centered on a caveat that is very close to an analogous recommendation
of Aristotle in the eighth Book of his Topics (Ross 1958): if there is something on
which a major aspect of the issue depends, this should be promptly delivered to the
audience as a ‘‘deposit’’, (in antecessum) and in every case before facing the point
we want to achieve by it and as if doing something else (III, 15: 8–12/p. 446). In
relation to this principle, a number of strategies facilitating the conquest of the
audience’s consent are illustrated. The persuasion process is presented like a multi-
attack strategy aimed at weakening the audience’s resistance both by masking one’s
own intention (i. e. the standpoint) and by identifying and anticipating those
premises that are easily accepted by the audience. In both cases indirect strategies
are preferred to an explicit and direct confrontation, so that the treatment of the
intended topic is postponed until all necessary premises are secured, and thus,
eventually, the audience feels accepting something that they already believed.
Moreover, the arguers should in all possible ways protect and promote their
argumentative reputation, especially by starting their speech with a strong and
effective argumentative move.
The sixteenth and last chapter of the third Book is devoted to the practices
facilitating the acquisition and enhancement of argumentative and rhetorical skills.
Without denying the complexity and even the extreme difficulty of such a
competence, mainly in relation to the recurrent necessity of extemporary public
interventions about unfamiliar issues, the author maintains that the acquisition of
27 Mack (1993: 219–220) signals Aristotle’s Categories (14a26–14b9) as a plausible source for this
treatment.
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this competence is never impossible: ‘‘the power of human mind is in fact
enormous, immense, unbelievable, so that for it almost nothing is difficult except
what it does not want’’ (III, 16: 117–118/p. 454). (Ingens enim, immensa,
incredibilis est uis mentis humanae, et cui nihil propemodum difficile sit nisi quod
non uult). I find that the examples brought by Agricola to illustrate the extraordinary
power of human mind are particularly felicitous and even surprising, like the case of
a person who, though being deaf and therefore dumb since the first years of his life,
however learned to understand every written text and to express by writing all his
own thoughts. In relation to the recovering of another perceptive disability Agricola
mentions blind people who proved to be able to walk through the network of the
town streets without losing their way, and to reach their home door. But the ability
of many musicians to improvise musical texts never encountered before is not less
surprising for Agricola. Analogously, he attributes to the human mind the potential
to reach an almost automatic mastery of argumentative strategies.
5 Conclusive Remarks
Both innovation and continuity characterize Agricola’s contribution to the study of
argumentation. While breaking with the Medieval tradition and adopting in relation
to it a rather polemical attitude, he established a critical continuity with Antiquity.
Numerous innovative aspects emerge in his doctrine: his autonomous, correctly
critical, attitude towards the authorities of tradition, his original classification and
definition of loci, the often sharp and fertile insights through which the nature of
each locus is highlighted, the richness of examples, the discovery of the relevant
role played by loci in exposition.
Indeed, despite a certain theoretical impoverishment, which is bound to the
removal of maxims, partly depending, in my opinion, on the negligence of the
relevant contributions provided by Medieval scholars, Agricola’s taxonomy
represents a substantial advancement, both regarding the identification and
justification of the single loci and the innovative categories adopted in the
construction of the major classes. Moreover, thanks to the discovery of the relevant
role played by them not only in argumentation but also in exposition, loci are no
longer exclusively argumentative categories. They become, in this new perspective,
the nodes of the ontological structure of reality that are available, in the construction
of human discourse, for the representation of reality aiming at describing it,
explaining it and arguing for it and from it.
Agricola’s work on dialectical invention really represents an important contri-
bution to the development of rhetoric and argumentation theory. However,
Agricola’s work does not only represent an important chapter in the history of
our discipline: for numerous topics it deserves to be considered in the current
scientific debate.
This holds in particular for the still controversial problem of argument schemes
that may be regarded as the present day heirs of loci. Evermore, Agricola’s position
represents in relation to argument schemes a very audacious challenge: by extending
the relevance of loci beyond argumentation to descriptive and explanatory discours,
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he linked loci to the meta-categorial level28 of rhetorical relations (also called
connective predicates) on which discursive congruity mainly depends (Rigotti 2005;
Rocci 2005; Rigotti and Rocci 2006). Eventually, he is our legitimate interlocutor
also in relation to the concept of strategic maneuvering (van Eemeren 2010), in
particular for the invention and selection of arguments, for the arrangement of
arguments and other presentational devices. The rhetorical dimension is often
predominant in his approach. However, the critical remark moved to Quintilian and
numerous passages in which the validity of arguments is considered also prove his
strong commitment to dialectical cogency.
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